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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
McKEE, Circuit Judge. 
 
We are asked to decide if a "union security clause" in a 
collective bargaining agreement r equired an employee in a 
purported "union shop" to continue paying any union dues 
after he resigned from the union. If we determine that the 
obligation to pay dues ceased, we must then decide if the 
employee has standing to seek review of an or der of the 
National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") denying attorney's 
fees for defending against the labor union's state court 
action to recover "delinquent" dues under the 
circumstances here. As a subset of that inquiry we will 
discuss whether the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") 
authorizes the NLRB to award attorney's fees to a non- 
profit corporation that provided fr ee legal services to the 
employee. 
 
For the reasons that follow, we hold that the disputed 
clause allows employees to stop paying all union dues upon 
resignation from the union. We also hold that the employee 
has no standing to challenge the NLRB's refusal to award 
attorney's fees in connection with the union's state court 
action because the employee incurred neither personal 
expense nor personal liability in defending against that 
suit. Inasmuch as the employee has no standing to contest 
the Board's denial of an award of attor ney's fees, we will 
dismiss the employee's petition for review, and grant the 
Board's petition for enforcement. 
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I. BACKGROUND 
 
The Graphic Communications International Union Local 
No. 735-S (the "Union") is the exclusive bar gaining 
representative for all full-time and r egular part-time 
production and maintenance employees at the Quebecor 
Printing Inc. facility in Hazleton, Pennsylvania (the 
"Company"). Section 2.2 of the relevant collective 
bargaining agreement between the Union and the Company 
(the "CBA") contained what is commonly r eferred to as a 
"union security clause"1 pr oviding as follows: 
 
       It is agreed that new employees shall be r equired as a 
       condition of continued employment to apply for 
       membership in the Union upon completion of the [90- 
       day] probationary period or on the ef fective date of the 
       Agreement, whichever is later. 
 
Section 2.4 of the CBA contained a dues checkof f 
authorizing the employer to withhold the amount of an 
employee's dues from his/her paycheck. Section 2.4 also 
stated that the dues checkoff authorization was irrevocable 
for a period of one year or until the expiration of the CBA, 
whichever was earlier, and that any timely r evocation would 
be effective 10 days after the Company r eceived written 
notice of it. 
 
Patrick Quick had been president of the Union while 
working for another employer in the 1960's. He was hired 
by NADCO, the Company's predecessor, as a general helper 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation, Inc., the non- 
profit organization that provided the free legal services to the employee 
here, does not agree that S 2.2 is a"union-security clause." Rather, it 
describes that provision as a "forced-unionism provision." See 
Foundation's Br. as Intervenor in No. 00-3032, at 4. 
 
The Foundation describes itself as a "charitable organization that 
provides free legal aid to individual employees suffering from abuses of 
compulsory unionism arrangements." Foundation's Br. in No. 99-4043, 
at 11. We do not attempt to resolve this rhetorical (and ideological) 
dispute. We will, however, refer to the provision as a "union security 
clause" because that is generally how courts describe provisions in 
collective bargaining units that purport to r equire union affiliation as 
a 
condition of employment. See Marquez v. Screen Actors Guild, 525 U.S. 
33 (1998). 
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in August of 1993. A collective bargaining agr eement 
between NADCO and the Union contained a union security 
clause identical to S 2.2 above. Quick joined the union and 
signed a checkoff authorization form when he was hired by 
NADCO. In 1995, the Company purchased NADCO and the 
CBA was ratified including SS 2.2 and 2.4. 
 
On August 23, 1996, Quick prepared and signed two 
letters. The first referred to a speech given at the Harvard 
School of Business concerning the importance of human 
assets in a business. It also contained his own thoughts 
about how a union should treat its members. Quick 
concluded that letter with: "Therefor e due to the fact that 
the above does not seem to be the purpose of this Union, 
I therefore submit the following r esignation." The second 
letter began: "I, Patrick D. Quick, do her eby resign" from 
the Union. It then listed his reasons and ended with: "I 
HEREBY RESIGN." Quick gave the documents to a 
Company employee named Charlie Allen. Allen was not an 
agent of the Union, but he accepted the letters and said 
that he would give them to the chief shop stewar d. Quick 
also gave copies of the letters to Jack Butler , the 
Company's Director of Human Resources. The company 
continued to deduct the full amount of union dues fr om 
Quick's paycheck after he delivered these letters. 
 
In March, 1997, Quick sent a letter to Thomas Obzut, the 
Union's treasurer-secretary. That letter stated: 
 
       As a non-member of [the Union] working in the 
       [Company's] bargaining unit, I am being forced to have 
       deducted from my pay an amount equivalent to the full 
       member dues. To the extent that I may be r equired to 
       pay anything to [the Union] I do not want to pay more 
       than is legally required. Specifically, I do not want to 
       pay if at all the "financial core" minimum2 required to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. As we will discuss later, under S 8(a)(3) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. 
S 158(a)(3), a union security clause can not r equire full union 
membership as a condition of employment. Patter n Makers' League of 
North America, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95, 106 (1985). Rather, 
"[u]nder S 8(a)(3), the only aspect of union membership that can be 
required pursuant to a union shop agr eement is the payment of dues." 
Id. at 106 n.16. Consequently, "[m]embership as a condition of 
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       support the Union's administration [of the CBA]. Please 
       advise me in writing 1) what the "financial cor e" 
       minimum amount is which the Union contents (sic) I 
       am required to pay, and 2) the basis for the Union's 
       calculation in that regard. 
 
The Union received that letter on March 11, 1997. On 
March 24, Obzut responded with a letter in which he 
informed Quick that the "financial cor e" amount was 
83.53% of full union dues. That letter further stated that 
Quick would receive a rebate of 16.47% every January as 
long as he remained a member of the Union. However, the 
full amount of union dues continued to be deducted from 
Quick's pay. 
 
On April 13, Quick sent the Union a letter r equesting 
financial justification for the Union's calculations of the 
percentage of dues owed by "financial cor e" members and 
objecting to paying full dues subject to an annual r ebate. 
On May 19, 1997, Obzut sent Quick a letter that began: 
"This is to advise you that I have received your letter stating 
your wish to become a non-member of the Union. Y ou 
further explained your wish to become a financial core 
member of the Union." The letter then argued the 
advantages of full union membership, and concluded,"if I 
do not hear from you again, I will assume that your 
resignation is effective as of May 1, . .. . You must notify 
me in writing if you wish to become a Beck objector as well 
. . . ."3 At this point, the Union regarded Quick as a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
employment is whittled down to its financial cor e." NLRB v. General 
Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 742 (1963)(inter nal citations omitted). An 
employee who does not want to be a full union member is called a 
"financial core" member. See Id. A financial core member is a " `member' 
of the union only in the most limited sense," and"is not subject to union 
discipline." Id. at 106 n.16. For example, we have held that a union 
cannot impose disciplinary fines on bargaining unit members who 
crossed a picket line and returned to work after notifying the union of 
their desire to change their status from full union members to financial 
core members. NLRB v. Local 54, Hotel Employees & Restaurant 
Employees International Union, ALF-CIO, 887 F.2d 28 (3d Cir. 1989). 
 
3. In Communications Workers of America v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 744 
(1988), the Court held that S 8(a)(3) of the NLRA does not require 
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financial core member effective May 1, 1997, and began 
deducting financial core dues from Quick's paycheck as of 
that date. 
 
On June 2, Quick sent another letter to the Union in 
which he asserted that he had previously r esigned from 
membership in the Union, that the requir ement that he 
continue to pay any dues violated the NLRA, and that the 
requirement was not justified under the CBA. That letter 
ended: "Effective (10) days from now I revoke my dues 
checkoff form I previously may have signed several years 
earlier." The Union received this letter on June 6 and the all 
dues deductions from Quick's paycheck ceased about ten 
days later. 
 
On June 10, Obzut acknowledged receipt of Quick's June 
2nd letter, but said that Quick, as past pr esident of the 
Union, knew that Pennsylvania was not a "right-to-work" 
state and that if he wished to continue to work for the 
Company, he would have to pay union dues pursuant to 
the CBA. However, Obzut followed up with yet another 
letter dated July 23, in which Obzut acknowledged Quick's 
right to discontinue Quick's dues checkoff. However, that 
letter continued: 
 
       Let me inform you that as long as you ar e a member 
       of [the Union] you are obligated to pay Union dues. . . . 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
financial core members "to support union activities beyond those 
germane to collective bargaining, contract administration and grievance 
adjustment." The Court concluded that S 8(a)(3) only authorizes a union 
to exact those dues "necessary to perfor ming the duties of an exclusive 
representative of the employees in dealing with the employer on labor- 
management issues." Id. at 762-63 (citation and internal quotations 
omitted). Consequently, financial core members "may request that their 
dues and fees be reduced by the percentage of funds allocated by the 
union to nonrepresentational activities," Thomas v. NLRB, 213 F.3d 651, 
654 (D.C. Cir. 2000), including such activities as lobbying and political 
campaigning. Id. Employees who request such a reduction in union fees 
are known as "Beck objectors." Id.  Beck objectors have a right to 
challenge the union's calculation of the reduced dues, Penrod v. NLRB, 
203 F.3d 41, 44 (D.C. Cir. 2000), by r equiring the union to justify the 
percentage deducted. Id. Despite Obzut's letter to the contrary, there 
does not appear to be any difference between a Beck objector and 
financial core membership. 
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       I suggest that you contact me within ten days after 
       receiving this notice as that (sic) we can discuss how 
       you are going to pay your dues. Let me also advise you 
       that you are now in arrears for thr ee weeks in June 
       and three weeks in July.4 
 
Quick responded with another letter of his own in which he 
said: 
 
       Your letter of July 23, totally misses the point of my 
       letter to you of June, 1997. I am not requir ed to pay 
       money to a union in order to work at [the Company] 
       not by checkoff, not otherwise. This is my right under 
       federal law. Similarly, you also incorrectly state "that 
       as long as you are a member of [the Union] you are 
       obligated to pay Union dues." But I am not a member 
       of [the Union]: as you well know, I have long since 
       resigned my membership in [the Union]. Therefore, 
       your statement that I am "in arrears" is also wrong. 
 
On August 11, Obzut sent Quick a letter that r ead: 
 
       I have just received your letter stating that Federal Law 
       forgives you, your requirement to pay Union Dues. I 
       strongly suggest that you check the law again. Federal 
       Law mandates that as long as you work in a Union 
       shop you must pay Dues. 
 
       If I do not hear from you concerning your Dues (you 
       are now in arrears) I will take Legal action against you 
       for the collection of your Union Dues. 
 
       I am giving you ten days from the date of this notice to 
       contact me so that we can rectify this matter . 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. There is some ambiguity as to whether the company ceased all 
deductions in June, or merely began deducting"core" dues. However, it 
appears that all deductions of dues ceased in mid June and thereafter 
the Union pursued the 85% portion that it maintained represented 
Quick's financial core obligation under the CBA. See the Union's Br. in 
opposition to the Petition for Enforcement at 9, and Quick's Br. as 
Intervenor at 10. 
 
We need not resolve this ambiguity with precision however, as we hold 
that the Union was not entitled even to "cor e payments" under this CBA 
after Quick resigned. 
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On September 8, Obzut sent Quick one final letter . In it, 
he told Quick that Quick was then in arrears for 13 weeks 
of financial core dues ($63.18), and Obzut r eiterated that 
he would take legal action to collect that amount on behalf 
of the Union. Shortly thereafter, the Union filed a lawsuit in 
state court seeking payment of the alleged arr earages. The 
Union claimed that Quick then owed dues from the second 
week of June through the first week of September. The 
Company's attorney assisted Quick in successfully 
removing the state suit to federal district court. Thereafter, 
Quick filed a charge with the NLRB and the NLRB 
subsequently issued a complaint charging that the Union 
had violated S 8(b)(1)(A) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. S 158(b)(1)(A),5 
by threatening Quick with legal action to coer ce payment of 
dues as a condition of employment, and by filing a lawsuit 
to collect the dues that Quick purportedly owed. 6 The 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the NLRA provides: 
 
       (b) Unfair labor practices by labor organization 
 
       It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor or ganization or 
its 
       agents-- 
 
       (1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the 
rights 
       guaranteed in section 157 of this title: Provided, That this 
paragraph 
       shall not impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its 
own 
       rules with respect to the acquisition or r etention of membership 
       therein;. . . . 
 
29 U.S.C. S 158(b)(1)(A). Section 157 gives the employees the following 
rights: 
 
       Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, 
or 
       assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through 
       representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other 
       concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or 
other 
       mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain 
       from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such 
right 
       may be affected by an agreement r equiring membership in a labor 
       organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 
       158(a)(3) of this title. 
 
29 U.S.C. S 157. 
 6. As noted earlier, the Company's attor ney helped Quick remove the 
Union's state court action to federal district court. In the district 
court, 
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complaint also alleged that the Union unlawfully r etained 
dues deducted from Quick's wages. After a hearing, the 
administrative law judge agreed that the Union had violated 
the Act, and the judge recommended that the Union be 
ordered to cease and desist that unlawful conduct and take 
affirmative action to remedy it. The NLRB adopted the ALJ's 
conclusions, affirmed the ALJ's decision, and adopted his 
recommended order. 
 
II. THE NLRB'S DECISION AND ORDER 
 
The NLRB agreed that Quick had effectively resigned 
from the Union in his March letter . It also agreed that S 2.2 
of the CBA did not require employees to continue paying 
any union dues after resigning from membership in the 
Union. Accordingly, the NLRB ruled that the Union had 
committed an unfair labor practice under S 8(b)(1)(A) of the 
NLRA, by continuing to accept dues deducted fr om Quick's 
wages after his resignation up to mid June, and by 
threatening to sue and by actually suing to collect 
"delinquent" dues. 
 
The NLRB ordered the Union to cease and desist the 
unlawful conduct, and from similarly restraining or 
coercing employees in the exercise of their statutory rights. 
It also ordered the Union to make Quick whole for all dues 
deducted from his wages beginning April 10, 1997 when his 
resignation became effective; to dismiss the lawsuit for the 
collection of union dues to the extent that it had not 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
the Company's counsel filed motions to dismiss for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P . 12(b)(1), and for failure 
to 
state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 12(b)(6). However, counsel for the Company withdrew his entry of 
appearance shortly before Quick's reply to the Union's Opposition to the 
Motions was due. The Company's attorney was understandably 
concerned about the propriety of the Company defending Quick against 
the Union. Immediately after the Company's attor ney withdrew his 
appearance, the Foundation entered its appearance for Quick. The 
Foundation represents, without contradiction from the Union, that the 
district court dismissed the Union's action to collect dues for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction. Foundation's Br . on Behalf of Quick as 
Petitioner in No. 99-4043, at 10-11. 
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already been finally dismissed or withdrawn; to give 
employees appropriate notice of the Boar d's determination; 
and to reimburse Quick for any expenses incurr ed in 
defending the lawsuit. However, the NLRB r efused to order 
the Union to pay attorney's fees to Quick's counsel. 
 
Quick filed a petition for review of the NLRB's order 
insofar as it denied his request for attor ney's fees (No. 99- 
4043) and the NLRB filed an application for enfor cement. 
(No. 00-3032). The Union intervened in Quick's petition for 
review and Quick intervened in the NLRB's petition for 
enforcement. 
 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
The NLRB's factual findings are conclusive if supported 
by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. See 
S 10(e) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. S 160(e). A reviewing court 
"may [not] displace the NLRB's choice between two fairly 
conflicting views, even though the court would justifiably 
have made a different choice had the matter been before it 
de novo." Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB , 340 U.S. 474, 
488 (1951). The NLRB's factual findings regar ding the 
intent of the parties to the collective bargaining agreement 
are entitled to the same deference as any other factual 
findings. IBEW Local 1395 v. NLRB, 797 F .2d 1027, 1030 
(D.C. Cir. 1986). However, the NLRB's legal interpretation of 
a collective bargaining agreement is not entitled to judicial 
deference. Litton Financial Printing Division v. NLRB, 501 
U.S. 190, 202 (1991). 
 
Familiar principles of judicial deference to an 
administrative agency apply to the NLRB's interpr etation of 
the NLRA. See Holly Farms Corp. v. NLRB , 517 U.S. 392, 
398-99 (1996). Therefore, the NLRB's construction of the 
NLRA will be upheld if it is "reasonably defensible." Ford 
Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488, 497 (1979). 7 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. If "Congress had directly spoken to the precise question at issue," 
then 
"the [reviewing] court as well as the[administrative] agency, must give 
effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress." Chevron USA, 
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 942-43 (1984). 
However, "if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to a specific 
issue, . . . a court may not substitute its own construction of a 
statutory 
provision for a reasonable interpretation made by . . . an agency." Id. at 
843-44. 
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IV. DISCUSSION 
 
The petitions pending before us raise thr ee separate and 
largely interdependent issues. We must first decide whether 
substantial evidence supports the NLRB's finding that the 
Union committed an unfair labor practice by accepting and 
retaining dues deducted from Quick's wages and by 
threatening to sue, then suing, to collect dues arrearages 
after Quick resigned from the Union. Quick's challenge to 
the NLRB's refusal to grant him attorney's fees for 
defending against the Union's action requir es us to decide 
if he is "aggrieved" by the NLRB's order within the meaning 
of S 10(f) of the Act. In answering that question, we will 
discuss whether the NLRA authorizes the awar d of 
attorney's fees of the non-profit corporation that provided 
free legal services to Quick. 
 
A. The NLRB's findings that the Union violated 
S 8(b)(1)(A). 
 
Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the NLRA, makes it an unfair labor 
practice for a labor union to "restrain or coerce employees" 
in the exercise of rights guaranteed underS 7 of the Act, 29 
U.S.C. S 157. Section 7 guarantees all employees the right 
to "self-organization, to form, join or assist labor 
organizations, to bargain collectively through 
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in 
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective 
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection." However, S 7 
also provides that employees "have the right to refrain from 
any or all of such activities except to the extent that such 
right may be affected by an agreement r equiring 
membership in a labor organization as a condition of 
employment as authorized" in S 8(a)(3) of the NLRA. 
 
Earlier, we stated that the NLRB ruled thatS 2.2 of the 
CBA (the purported union security clause) "does not require 
that employees continue to pay dues to [the Union], as a 
condition of employment, after they have applied for 
membership but thereafter have resigned fr om 
membership." NLRB's Decision and Order , at 4. 
Consequently the NLRB held that the Union committed an 
unfair labor practice by continuing to accept dues that had 
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been deducted from Quick's pay after his r esignation from 
the Union, and by attempting to collect dues that it claimed 
Quick owed despite his resignation. 
 
Although the Union does not dispute Quick's right to  
resign,8 it contends thatS 2.2 of the CBA required him to at 
least pay that percentage of dues that would constitute core 
financial payments.9 Thus, ar gues the Union, because 
Quick was required to meet his financial core obligation, it 
did not commit an unfair labor practice under S 8(b)(1)(A) 
by continuing to collect his dues or attempting to collect 
arrearages. 
 
Our resolution of this dispute turns on the scope of 
S 8(a)(3) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. S 158(a)(3). "Section 8(a)(3) 
makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to 
"encourage or discourage membership" in a labor union "by 
discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or 
any term or condition of employment." However, this 
prohibition has two specific exceptions that allow an 
employer and Union to enter into a collective bar gaining 
agreement that conditions employment upon union 
affiliation. With certain exceptions not r elevant to our 
discussion, the NLRA limits the prohibition against 
encouraging or discouraging union membership as follows: 
"nothing in this subchapter, . . . shall preclude an employer 
from making an agreement with a labor or ganization . . . to 
require as a condition of employment membership therein. 
. . .". 29 U.S.C. S 158(a)(3). 
 
       Both the structure and purpose of S 8(a)(3) are best 
       understood in light of the statute's historical origins. 
       Prior to the enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, 
       S 8(a)(3) of the Wagner Act of 1935 (NLRA) permitted 
       majority unions to negotiate "closed shop" agr eements 
       requiring employers to hire only persons who were 
       already union members. By 1947, such agr eements 
       had come under increasing attack, and after extensive 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Section 8(a)(1)(A) prohibits union r estrictions on a member's right to 
resign. Pattern Makers' League of North America, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 473 
U.S. 95, 104-114 (1985). 
 
9. See n.2 supra and the discussion that follows in this section of the 
discussion. 
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       hearings Congress determined that the closed shop 
       and the abuses associated with it "create[d] too great a 
       barrier to free employment to be longer tolerated." The 
       1947 Congress was equally concerned, however, that 
       without such agreements, many employees would r eap 
       the benefits that unions negotiated on their behalf 
       without in any way contributing financial support to 
       those efforts. As Senator Taft, one of the authors of the 
       1947 legislation, explained, "the argument . . . against 
       abolishing the closed shop . . . is that if ther e is not a 
       closed shop those not in the union will get a fr ee ride, 
       that the union does the work, gets the wages raised, 
       then the man who does not pay dues rides along fr eely 
       without any expense to himself." Thus, the T aft-Hartley 
       Act was "intended to accomplish twin purposes. On the 
       one hand, the most serious abuses of compulsory 
       unionism were eliminated by abolishing the closed 
       shop. On the other hand, Congress r ecognized that in 
       the absence of a union-security provision`many 
       employees sharing the benefits of what unions ar e able 
       to accomplish by collective bargaining will r efuse to pay 
       their share of the cost.' " 
 
Communications Workers of America v. Beck , 487 U.S. 735, 
747-49 (1988)(footnote and citations omitted)(emphasis 
added). Thus, "Congress recognized the validity of unions' 
concern about `free riders,' i. e., employees who receive the 
benefits of union representation but ar e unwilling to 
contribute their share of financial support to such union. . 
. ." Radio Officers Union of Commer cial Telegraphers Union, 
AFL v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 41 (1954). Congr ess enacted 
S 8(a)(3), in part, to "promote stability by eliminating `free 
riders." NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 
741(1963). Consequently, "[a]s far as federal law was 
concerned, all employees could be requir ed to pay their 
way." Id. 
 
The provisos of "S 8(a)(3) allow[ ] employers to enter into 
agreements requiring all the employees in a given 
bargaining unit to become members 30 days after being 
hired as long as such membership is available to all 
workers on a nondiscriminatory basis, but . . . pr ohibit[ ] 
the mandatory discharge of an employee who is expelled 
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from the union for any reason other than his or her failure 
to pay initiation fees or dues." Communications Workers of 
America v. Beck, 487 U.S. at 749. 
 
In other words, S 8(a)(3) permits the establishment of 
what has come to be known as a "union shop." 
International Association of Machinists & Aer ospace Workers 
v. NLRB, 133 F.3d 1012, 1014 (7th Cir .), cert. denied sub 
nom., Strang v. NLRB, 525 U.S. 813 (1998). Section 8(a)(3) 
is the statutory authorization for "union security clauses," 
which establish and maintain a union shop. Mar quez v. 
Screen Actors Guild, Inc., 525 U.S. 33, 37 (1998)(citation 
omitted). 
 
Although S 8(a)(3) allows the parties to a collective 
bargaining agreement to requir e union "membership" as a 
condition of employment, it does not define the nature of 
the "membership" that can be requir ed. However, in NLRB 
v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. at 742, the Court held 
that membership "insofar as it has significance to 
employment rights, may . . . be conditioned only upon 
payment of fees and dues." Consequently, " `[m]embership' 
as a condition of employment is whittled down to its 
financial core." Id. Thus, underS 8(a)(3), while the 
employees in a union shop are not requir ed to become full 
union "members", they are requir ed to pay union dues and 
initiation fees. Marquez v. Screen Actors Guild, 525 U.S. at 
37 ("[A]n employee can satisfy the membership condition 
merely by paying to the union an amount equal to the 
union's initiation fees and dues.").10  Under S 8(a)(3) unions 
are allowed to collect and expend funds of nonmember 
objectors in union shops only to the extent that such funds 
are used for collective bargaining, contract administration, 
and grievance adjustment activities. Beck, 487 U.S. at 745. 
Employees in the bargaining unit who ar e not union 
members, and who object to the use of their dues for 
purposes other than negotiating and administering a 
collective bargaining agreement, ar e therefore entitled to a 
proportional reduction in the amount of dues charged. Id. 
at 762-763; see also Association of Machinists & Aerospace 
Workers, 133 F.3d at 1015. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. These employees are known as "financial core" members. See also 
n.3 supra. 
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Essentially then, "membership," as that ter m is used in 
S 8(a)(3) is a "term of art; [and] the words and phrasing of 
the section . . . encompass the rights . . . announced in 
General Motors and Beck." Mar quez, 525 U.S. at 46. In 
addition, because an employee can be dischar ged from 
employment in a union shop for failing to meet theS 8(a)(3) 
"membership" requirement, see , Radio Officers Union of 
Commercial Telegraphers Union, AFL v. NLRB, 347 U.S. at 
41,11 the union is to"notify workers that they may satisfy 
their membership requirement by paying fees to support 
the union's representational activities, and it must enforce 
the clause in conformity with this notification." Marquez, 
525 U.S. at 43. With this background in mind, we will 
begin our inquiry into the issues raised by the Petition for 
Review and the Petition for Enforcement her e. 
 
In holding that Quick was not obligated to pay dues 
pursuant to S 2.2 of the CBA after he r esigned from the 
Union, the NLRB affirmed the ALJ's r easoning as follows: 
 
       In ascertaining the obligations of employees under[a 
       union security clause], the NLRB looks only to the 
       express language of the agreed on contractual 
       provision. Because the penalty for employees who fail 
       to pay dues under a lawful union-security pr ovision 
       may be discharge, this rule serves the valid purpose of 
       assuring that employees may determine their 
       obligation and avoid the penalty of discharge without 
       fear that there are unwritten qualifications added to 
       the express contractual provisions. . . . 
 
        [T]he instant union-security clause . . . clearly 
       requires only that employees "apply for membership" in 
       the [Union] upon completion of the employees' 
       probationary period. It does not requir e that employees 
       maintain membership in, or pay dues to, [the Union] as 
       a condition of employment. It fails to give notice to 
       employees of any obligation that would restrict their 
       right to resign from [the Union] and cease paying dues. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. Wherein the Court stated: "Thus an employer can discharge an 
employee for nonmembership in a union if the employer has entered a 
union security contract valid under the Act with such union, and if the 
other requirements of the proviso ar e met." 
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       [We] conclude that the contractual language in this 
       case does not require that employees continue to pay 
       dues to [the Union], as a condition of employment, 
       after they have applied for membership but ther eafter 
       have resigned from membership. 
 
NLRBs' Decision and Order, at 3-4. Although we do not owe 
the NLRB's interpretation of the CBA defer ence, Litton 
Financial Printing Division, 501 U.S. at 202, we conclude 
that the NLRB correctly affirmed the ALJ's interpretation of 
the union security clause here. 
 
As the NLRB correctly noted, the unambiguous text of 
S 2.2 only requires new employees to apply for membership 
in the union upon completion of their probationary period. 
It requires only that, and nothing mor e. It does not contain 
any language that would even suggest that an employee 
must maintain his/her membership in the Union and pay 
dues to the Union as a condition of continued employment 
with the Company. Thus, this CBA is quite dif ferent from 
the one we interpreted in NLRB v. T elevision and Radio 
Broadcast Studio Employees Local 804, 315 F.2d 398, 401 
(3d Cir. 1963). There, the collective bargaining agreement 
stated: "The [Employer] agrees to maintain a Union Shop, 
requiring that all employees (. . .) shall become members of 
the Union and all future employees must become members 
of the Union within thirty (30) days after employment, and 
that all employees will continue their membership in the 
Union during the term of this agreement . . .". (emphasis 
added). 
 
Despite the obvious differences between the agreement 
here and the one exemplified by Studio Employees Local 
804 (or perhaps because of them) the Union argues that the 
NLRB's interpretation of S 2.2 is too literal. The Union 
insists that the narrowness of the NLRB's interpretation 
both ignores and undermines much of the congressional 
purpose for enacting S 8(a)(3). 
 
As noted earlier, Congress was concer ned that some 
employees would get a free ride on the back of the union's 
representational efforts if employees could refuse to pay 
their share of the cost of the union's r epresentational 
activities. Beck, 487 U.S. at 749. Thus,S 8(a)(3) was 
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enacted, in part, to promote labor stability by eliminating 
"free riders." General Motors, 373 U.S. at 742-3. The Union 
attempts to rewrite the CBA by parlaying this congressional 
concern into language that simply does not exist in S 2.2, 
and by emphasizing that the NLRB's interpretation of that 
clause has allowed Quick (and others in the bar gaining 
unit) to become a "free rider." 
 
On the surface, the Board's interpr etation allowing "free 
riders" appears to undermine the car efully crafted statutory 
scheme of the Act as well as the policy considerations 
embodied in S 8(a)(3). However, Congr ess never intended 
S 8(a)(3) to function as a blanket prohibition of "free riders." 
Rather, S 8(a)(3) simply authorizes unions and employers to 
create a union shop and thereby agr ee that there will not 
be any "free riders" under a given collective bargaining 
agreement. See General Motors, 373 U.S. at 741 ("As far as 
federal law was concerned, all employees could be required 
to pay their way.")(emphasis added). 
 
Quick is permitted to become a "free rider" because of the 
draftsmanship of S 2.2 not because the NLRB erroneously 
interpreted that clause or ignored the underpinnings of 
S 8(a)(3). After all, we must also remember that one of the 
NLRA's "fundamental policies is freedom of contract." H. K. 
Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 108 (1970). The NLRB 
"oversee[s] and referee[s] the process of collective 
bargaining, leaving the results of the contest to the 
bargaining strengths of the parties." Id. The NLRB thus 
supervises the procedure of private bar gaining "without any 
official compulsion over the actual terms of the contract." 
Id. Inasmuch as S 8(a)(3) does not demand the elimination 
of "free riders," the NLRB, as the r eferee of the collective 
bargaining process, cannot read language eliminating "free 
riders" into a collective bargaining agr eement where the 
parties' own bargain omitted it. 
 
Moreover, the Union's insistence that it was entitled to 
deduct Quick's core financial obligation following his 
resignation completely misses the point. An employee's core 
financial obligation can be deducted under a pr operly 
drafted union security clause because such a clause 
conditions employment upon union membership, i.e., union 
financial support. Since S 2.2 imposes no such obligation, 
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the Union could not create it by the unilateral act of 
deducting prorated representational and administrative 
costs from Quick's pay following his resignation from the 
Union. 
 
The Union insists that this result ignor es the Supreme 
Court's decision in Marquez v. Scr een Actors Guild, Inc. We 
disagree. There, the Screen Actors Guild ("SAG") - a labor 
organization that represents per formers in the 
entertainment industry - had a collective bar gaining 
agreement with Lakeside Productions pursuant to which 
SAG was the exclusive bargaining agent for per formers 
hired by Lakeside. The agreement contained a union 
security clause providing that any perfor mer hired must be 
a "member of the Union in good standing." Id. at 38. The 
agreement also "[t]rack[ed] the language of S 8(a)(3)," id., in 
stating: 
 
       The foregoing [section], requiring as a condition of 
       employment membership in the Union, shall not apply 
       until on or after the thirtieth day following the 
       beginning of such employment or the effective date of 
       this Agreement, whichever is the later; the Union and 
       the Producers interpret this sentence to mean that 
       membership in the Union cannot be requir ed of any 
       performer by a Producer as a condition of employment 
       until thirty (30) days after his first employment as a 
       performer in the motion picture industry . . . . The 
       Producer shall not be held to have violated this 
       paragraph if it employs a performer who is not a 
       member of the Union in good standing . . . if the 
       Producer has reasonable grounds for believing that 
       membership in the Union was denied to such 
       performer or such performer's membership in the 
       Union was terminated for reasons other than the 
       failure of the performer to tender the periodic dues and 
       the initiation fee uniformly requir ed as a condition of 
       acquiring or retaining membership in the Union . . . . 
 
Id. at 38-39 (emphasis added). Marquez, a part-time actress 
who had previously worked in the industry for more than 
30 days, successfully auditioned for a one-line r ole in a 
television series produced by Lakeside. However , she was 
denied the part because she had not paid SAG's r equired 
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fees before beginning work. She sued SAG in federal court 
alleging that SAG had breached its duty of fair  
representation12 by, inter alia, negotiating and enforcing a 
union security clause which required membership and the 
payment of full dues and fees even though that r equirement 
could not legally be enforced under General Motors and 
Beck. She also contended that the CBA should have 
contained additional language informing her of her rights 
under General Motors and Beck and telling her that she was 
not required to join SAG, but was only r equired to pay for 
SAG's representational activities. 
 
The Court held that SAG had not breached its duty of 
fair representation. The Court agr eed that: "[i]f a union 
negotiates a union security clause, it must notify workers 
that they may satisfy the membership requir ement by 
paying fees to support the union's repr esentational 
activities, and it must enforce the clause in conformity with 
this notification." The Court nonetheless held that a union 
does not breach its duty of fair repr esentation "by 
negotiating a union security clause that uses the statutory 
language without expressly explaining, in the agreement, 
the refinements introduced by. . . General Motors and 
Beck." Id. at 43-44. The Court r easoned that: 
 
       by tracking the statutory language [of S 8(a)(3)] [SAG] 
       incorporate[d] all of the refinements that have become 
       associated with that language. When we interpr eted 
       S 8(a)(3) in General Motors and Beck, we held that the 
       section, fairly read, included the rights that we found. 
       To the extent that these interpretations are not obvious, 
       the relevant provisions of S 8(a)(3) have become terms of 
       art; the words and phrasing of the section now 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. "When a labor organization has been selected as the exclusive 
representative of the employees in the bar gaining unit, it has a duty, 
implied from its status under S 9(a) of the NLRA as the exclusive 
representative of the employees in the unit, to represent all members 
fairly." Marquez, at 44. When a plaintiff challenges an action that is 
arguably subject to S 7 or S 8 of the NLRA, that challenge is within the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB. Id. at 49. However, when a plaintiff 
"alleges a breach of the duty of fair r epresentation, [the] claim is 
cognizable in the first instance in federal court." Id. 
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       encompass the rights that we announced in General 
       Motors and Beck. 
 
Id. at 46 (emphasis added). In other wor ds, the "statutory 
language [of S 8(a)(3)], which . . . incorporates all of the 
refinements associated with the language, is a shorthand 
description of workers' legal rights." Id. at 47(emphasis 
added). Accordingly, there was no need for SAG "to spell 
out all the intricacies of every term used in a contract." Id. 
 
The Union insists that Marquez fills in the gaps in its 
collective bargaining agreement with the Company, and 
that Quick was therefore at least obligated to make 
financial core payments under Mar quez. Consequently, 
argues the Union, the NLRB's finding that Quick had no 
obligation to pay any dues after his resignation from the 
Union was error. 
 
However, the clause at issue in Mar quez, allowed core 
financial fees to be deducted from Mar quez's salary because 
of its explicit terms requiring union membership. The Court 
had previously defined the nature of the membership that 
could be required to include only cor e financial support of 
the union. Accordingly, a collective bar gaining agreement 
requiring membership in the Union was all that was needed 
to mandate "core" financial support. Section 2.2 of the CBA 
neither tracks the language of S 8(a)(3) nor r equires 
employees to maintain union membership. As we have 
already explained, it only requires that workers apply for 
membership in the Union as a condition of employment. 
Therefore, we can not agree that the NLRB's interpretation 
of S 2.2 ignored the holding in Mar quez. Rather, the NLRB's 
reasoning is consistent with the analysis and holding in 
Marquez. 
 
The Union concedes that the union security clause here 
is "somewhat ambiguous in that it does not specifically 
outline the obligations of bargaining unit members once 
they have joined the Union as required by the clause." 
Union's Br. as Respondent in Application for Enforcement 
(No. 00-3032), at 23. However, the Union, ar gues that "past 
practice" included requiring all bar gaining unit members to 
make, at a minimum, financial core payments to the Union. 
Id. at 23-24. Therefore, ar gues the Union, the NLRB should 
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have honored the parties' interpretation of the CBA as 
evidenced by their "past practice." Id.  at 24. In other words, 
the Union contends that extrinsic evidence in the form of 
testimony regarding the alleged "past practice," would 
establish that all employees in the bargaining unit knew 
that they were at least required to make financial core 
payments to the Union, and that that obligation was part of 
S 2.2 of the CBA. 
 
However, the Union does not even begin to discuss the 
standards for introducing extrinsic evidence to interpret a 
written contract.13 Moreover , it does not appear that there 
is any real evidence of "past practice" in this record. At 
most, there is evidence here of what one bargaining unit 
member, Quick, was told by a member of management, on 
one occasion. The Union cites to testimony that the 
Company's Human Resource Manager told Quick that he 
could become a financial core member. The Union then 
argues that Quick responded by saying that he intended to 
do so. See Union's Br. as Respondent in Application for 
Enforcement (No. 00-3032), at 25. This is not evidence of 
"past practice." As a general principle, past practice is 
admissible to interpret a contract: "Wher e an agreement 
involves repeated occasions for perfor mance by either party 
with knowledge of the nature of the per formance and 
opportunity for objection to it by the other , any course of 
performance accepted or acquiesced in without objection is 
given great weight in the interpretation of the agreement." 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts S 202(4). However, the 
rule allowing evidence of past practice "does not apply to an 
action on a single occasion." Id. cmt. g. 
 
Moreover, extrinsic evidence of "past practice" could be 
admitted, if at all, only to resolve an ambiguity in the CBA. 
In U.A.W. Local 1697 v. Skinner Engine Company, 188 F.3d 
130 (3rd Cir. 1999, we stated: 
 
       Although extrinsic evidence is admissible to show that 
       a written contract which looks clear is actually 
       ambiguous, perhaps because the parties wer e using 
       words in a special sense, . . . there must be either 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. See generally Mellon Bank, N. A. v. Aetna Business Credit, Inc., 619 
F.2d 1001, 1009-13 (3d Cir. 1980). 
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       contractual language on which to hang the label of 
       ambiguous or some yawning void . . . that cries out for 
       an implied term. Extrinsic evidence should not be used 
       to add terms to a contract that is plausibly complete 
       without them. 
 
Id. at 146 (internal quotation and citations omitted). Here, 
the NLRB correctly affirmed the ALJ's conclusion that there 
was nothing ambiguous about the clause in question. 
Section 2.2 contains no "void," nor does it cry out for us to 
contradict its text by implying a term. 
 
We disagree with the Union's purported concession that 
the union security clause here is "somewhat ambiguous 
. . . ." Rather, we agree with the Board's conclusion that the 
clause unambiguously requires employees to"apply" for, 
but not maintain, union membership. To be sur e, the 
clause is probably poorly drafted and incomplete, but poor 
draftsmanship does not necessarily result in an ambiguity. 
Here, it simply results in a clause that can not reasonably 
be read as the Union suggests. 
 
Admittedly, the NLRB's interpretation would r esult in an 
absurdity from the Union's standpoint because all 
employees could resign from Union membership and no 
longer be required to pay any dues at all after submitting 
the required application. Thus, the clause as interpreted 
does not guarantee the existence of the union shop that the 
Union apparently bargained for. However, the Union 
negotiated this clause with the Company, and that is the 
bargain it struck. Perhaps the Union agreed to this 
language because it assumed it could retain new members. 
It may also be as we surmise above, that the language is 
simply the result of poor drafting. However , it is not for us 
to say. It is not for this court to interpret the language in 
a manner that rewrites the CBA. Inasmuch asS 2.2 is plain 
on its face, we are bound by this interpr etation. 
 
The Union also suggests that S 2.4 - the checkoff of union 
dues authorization - requires that an employee who resigns 
from union membership nonetheless continue to pay dues 
for the period of the irrevocability defined in the checkoff. 
However, that argument is without merit. A checkoff 
authorization is a partial assignment of futur e wages to the 
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union and is generally valid only if union membership is 
required as a condition of employment. IBEW Local 2088, 
302 NLRB 322, 328-329 (1991). Once the employee r esigns 
from the union, the assignment is no longer valid, absent 
explicit language to the contrary. Id. This CBA contains no 
contrary language. 
 
The Union also argues that the NLRB's interpr etation of 
S 2.2 would result in discrimination in violation of S 8(a)(3). 
See Union's Br. as Respondent in Application for 
Enforcement (No. 00-3032), at 31-33. The Union claims the 
checkoff authorization requires payment of union dues for 
one year after joining the Union. Thus, argues the Union, 
under the NLRB's interpretation, bargaining unit members 
who have not been with the Company for one year must 
pay dues, while bargaining unit members, like Quick, who 
have been with the Company in excess of one year can 
resign and not pay dues. In the Union's view, new 
employees are required to support the union, while more 
senior workers are not, and the Union ar gues that this 
amounts to illegal discrimination against new workers.14 We 
are not persuaded. Since the checkoff authorization is valid 
only if union membership is required by the union security 
clause, it is the union security clause that establishes a 
union shop, not a dues checkoff. Inasmuch asS 2.2 permits 
an employee to resign from the union after applying for 
membership, there can be no new worker vs. older worker 
discrimination because anyone can resign fr om 
membership after the probationary period is over. 
 
For all of the above reasons, we find thatS 2.2 of the CBA 
does not require Company employees to continue paying 
any union dues as a condition of employment after they 
resign from membership in the Union. Since Quick was not 
required to make any payments to the Union following his 
resignation, the Union's attempts to collect"arrearages" 
was a violation of S 8(b)(1)(A), see Pr ofessional Assoc. of Golf 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. According to the Union, this scenario"requires the employer to 
`discriminat[e] in regard to[a] term or condition of employment to 
encourage membership in [the Union]' in dir ect violation of Section 
8(a)(3) of the Act." Union's Br. as Respondent in Application for 
Enforcement (No. 00-3032), at 33. 
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Officials, 317 NLRB 774, 778-79 (1995),15 and the Board 
did not err in enjoining that lawsuit based upon the suit's 
unlawful objective. See Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. 
NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 737-38 n.5 (1983). 
 
One matter remains before concluding our discussion of 
the Board's interpretation of S 2.2. The Union argues that 
there is no evidence to support a finding that Quick 
resigned prior to June 2, 1997. The Union insists that the 
NLRB's finding that the Union violated S 8(b)(1)(A) was 
therefore erroneous because the Union reduced Quick's 
dues to the financial core obligation r etroactive to May 1, 
1997. This argument appears to proceed as follows: Obzut 
acknowledged that Quick no longer wanted to be a member 
of the Union and told Quick that he assumed Quick's 
resignation would be effective as of May 1, 1997 in his May 
19, 1997, letter to Quick. Quick responded by sending 
Obzut a letter on June 2, 1997 telling Obzut that he had 
previously resigned from membership in the Union and 
protesting the continued deduction of dues fr om his pay. 
The Union insists that Quick's June 2, 1997 letter was the 
first time that Quick ever indicated to the Union that he 
wanted to resign.16 Consequently, the Union accepted 
Quick's June 2, 1997 "resignation" r etroactively to May 1, 
1997. However, the Union says that because it only sought 
to collect arrearages of full union dues prior to May 1, 
1997, and financial core payments after that date, it could 
not have violated S 8(b)(1)(A) because it was entitled to 
collect both types of dues at the respective times. Union's 
Br. as Respondent in Application for Enfor cement (No. 00- 
3032), at 41-42.17 However, the record supports the Board's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. The CBA in Prof. Assoc. of Golf Officials did not contain a union 
security clause, and the Board held that a lawsuit to collect dues in the 
absence of a union security clause was a violation of S 8(b)(1)(A). Here, 
of course, there is a purported union security clause. However, since 
that clause does not require union membership, the Union can not 
extract dues after resignation from the Union, and its attempts to do so 
violate S 8(b)(1)(A) under the reasoning of Prof. Assoc. of Golf 
Officials. 
16. The letter that Quick prepared on August 23, 1996 were not 
delivered to agents of the Union, and the r ecord therefore does not 
establish any notice to the Union based on those letters. 
 
17. The Union argues: "[b]ecause the Union sought only to recover 
arrearages of the full union dues prior to Mr . Quick's resignation, which 
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findings as to the date of Quick's resignation, and we do 
not believe that the Union's view of the facts is totally 
accurate. Our review of the record establishes that dues 
deductions from Quick's pay were not stopped until about 
10 days after Quick's June 2 letter. The Company deducted 
dues from Quick's pay at least until June 16, 1997. 
Consequently, there were no arrearages prior to May 1, 
1997. Moreover, the Union's state court complaint 
corroborates this. In that complaint the Union clearly 
alleges: "Mr. Quick refuses to pay union dues in the 
amount of $63.18 dating back to the second week of June 
until present." App. at 17 (emphasis added). The "present" 
was September 30, 1997, the date the complaint wasfiled. 
The Union was not entitled to any amount of dues after 
Quick resigned. 
 
The Union's challenge to the Board's findings also ignores 
Quick's March, 1997 letter. That letter began: "[a]s a non- 
member of [the Union] working in the [Company's] 
bargaining unit, I am being forced to have deducted from 
my pay an amount equivalent to full member dues." 
Though that letter does not explicitly state: "I resign[ ]," it 
did not have to. "An employee may communicate his 
resignation from membership in any feasible way and no 
particular form is required so long as he clearly indicates 
that he no longer wishes to remain a member ." Distillery 
Workers Local 80, 235 NLRB 1264, 1265 (1978). Moreover, 
even assuming arguendo that the numer ous letters 
exchanged between Quick and Obzut could have led the 
Union to believe that Quick had not resigned as of March, 
1997, a reviewing court "may [not] displace the NLRB's 
choice between two fairly conflicting views, even though the 
court would justifiably have made a differ ent choice had the 
matter been before it de novo," Universal Camera Corp. v. 
NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951). Thus, the Boar d's finding 
that Quick resigned in March of 1997 is supported by 
substantial evidence and, the Union's contention that the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
the Union retroactively accepted as of May 1, 1997 -- even though Mr. 
Quick had not, as of that date, expressed a clear intent to resign, and 
financial core payments after that resignation, the Union's actions were 
per se lawful under Beck." 
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effective date of resignation is June 2, 1997, must be 
rejected. 
 
B. Involvement of the Company's Attorney.  
 
The Union also contends that the Company violated 
S 8(a)(1) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. S 158(a)(1), by providing 
Quick with counsel in an effort "to invalidate a union 
security provision legally recognized by past practice 
between the parties in a collective bargaining relationship." 
Union's Br. as Respondent in Application for Enforcement 
(No. 00-3032), at 27. Section 8(a)(1) makes it an unfair 
labor practice for an employer "to interfer e with, restrain, or 
coerce employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed" 
in S 7 of the Act. The Union appears to be ar guing that the 
Company wanted to invalidate the union security clause 
and therefore instigated Quick's r esignation and refusal to 
pay dues then supplied him with an attorney, Semler, to 
fight against the Union's efforts to collect.18 The Union 
further alleges that Semler obtained the law fir m of Rosenn, 
Jenkins and Greenwald, to represent Quick. Finally, the 
Union claims that Semler prepared the unfair labor practice 
charge that Quick filed with the NLRB. The Union believes 
that all of this "Company-provided legal advice has been 
directed at terminating Mr. Quick's obligation to the Union 
and invalidating the union security clause fr eely agreed 
upon between the Union and [the Company]." Id. at 30. 
 
However, the Union's attack upon the Company and its 
involvement with Quick is beyond the scope of our r eview. 
Although the Union did file a charge alleging that the 
Company committed an unfair labor practice by pr oviding 
Quick with counsel, the General Counsel refused to issue a 
complaint on that charge. The General Counsel's exercise of 
discretion in refusing to issue a complaint is not subject to 
judicial review. NLRB v. Food & Commer cial Workers Local 
23, 484 U.S. 112, 122-23 (1987). Accordingly, we could 
only consider an allegation of the Company's unlawful 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
18. Steven R. Semler was the Company's lawyer and he helped Quick 
draft a response to the Union's notice that Quick was in arrears for past 
financial core obligations. Semler also filed the notice of removal when 
the Union sued Quick in state court. 
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conduct if that conduct arguably constituted a defense to 
the charge against the Union. See Chicago Tribune Co., 304 
NLRB 259, 260 (1991). The NLRB found that the 
Company's conduct was not a defense to the Union's 
unlawful conduct. See NLRB's Decision and Or der at 4. 
 
Moreover, the Board affir med the ALJ's conclusion "that 
there is no credible evidence to support[the Union's] 
assertion that [the Company], through Quick, attempted to 
invalidate the union-security provision. . . . The record 
clearly shows that Quick's desire to resign from 
membership preceded any assistance from the [Company] 
and was not caused by such assistance" That finding is 
supported by the record. Quick first indicated his intention 
to resign from the Union in August of 1996, and the NLRB 
found that his resignation was effective as of March, 1997. 
Quick received no legal assistance from the Company's 
attorney until July of 1997. 
 
In its Decision and Order, the Boar d ordered the Union 
to reimburse Quick for any personal expenses he actually 
incurred in defending against the Union's lawsuit to collect 
his alleged arrearages after it concluded that the Union had 
engaged in unfair labor practices. Board's Decision and 
Order, at 1 n.2. However, Quick testified at the Board 
hearing that he did not incur any such expenses in 
defending against the Union's lawsuit. App. at 168-69. 
Moreover, both Semler and the Foundation agreed to 
represent him free of charge. 19 Nonetheless, Quick filed a 
petition for review in which he alleges that the NLRB erred 
by not awarding attorney's fees and costs to the Foundation 
for representing him in the Union's suit to collect $63.18 in 
arrearages. 
 
Section 10(f) of the NLRA provides in r elevant part: 
 
       Any person aggrieved by a final order of the NLRB 
       granting or denying in whole or in part the r elief 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
19. Semler waived any claim for his fees and costs. The Foundation 
admits that it has no fee arrangement with Quick and that it represented 
him for free. It also admits that Quick has not incurred any expenses in 
his defense of the Union's' lawsuit. Foundation's Br . on Behalf of Quick 
on Petition for Review (No. 99-4043), at 11 n.2. 
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       sought may obtain a review of such order in any 
       United States court of appeals in the circuit wherein 
       the unfair labor practice in question was alleged to 
       have been engaged in or wherein such person r esides 
       or transacts business. 
 
Although S 10(f) does not define "aggrieved," courts have 
held that one must suffer "an adverse ef fect in fact," to be 
"aggrieved" under the NLRA. Retail Clerks Union 1059 v. 
NLRB, 348 F.2d 369, 370 (D.C. Cir . 1965). See also Sierra 
Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 733 (1972) (persons are 
"aggrieved" within the meaning of the Administrative 
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. S 702, only if the agency action 
causes them "injury in fact."). 29 U.S.C.S 160(f). Not 
surprisingly, because Quick admitted that he incurr ed no 
personal expenses in defending the Union's lawsuit and 
because the Board's order assures him full reimbursement 
for any such expenses in any event, the Boar d argues that 
Quick has no standing to seek review of thefinal order 
denying fees because he is not "aggrieved" within the 
meaning of S 10(f) of the NLRA. We agr ee. 
 
Since Quick incurred no personal expenses in defending 
against the Union's lawsuit and since the Foundation 
volunteered to represent him at no charge, we are hard- 
pressed to understand how Quick can now maintain that 
he suffered an "adverse effect in fact" by the NLRB's refusal 
to order the Union to pay him for legal expenses he never 
incurred and for which he has no personal liability. The 
NLRB expressly ordered the Union to r eimburse Quick for 
any expenses he did incur in defending himself against the 
Union's lawsuit, and he is therefore assur ed full 
reimbursement for whatever personal obligations he may 
have incurred. Accordingly, the NLRB's or der precludes 
Quick from suffering any "injury in fact." Therefore, we 
conclude that Quick is not an "aggrieved" person under 
S 10(f) of the Act, and has no standing to seek review of the 
NLRB's order denying his request for attor ney's fees. 
 
We realize that at least one court has concluded that 
although S 10(f) requires "an adverse effect in fact," it does 
not "require an injury cognizable at law or equity." Oil, 
Chemical & Atomic Workers Local Union No. 6-418, AFL-CIO 
v. NLRB, 694 F.2d 1289, 1294 (D.C. Cir . 1982) (citation 
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omitted). Under that view, "[a]s long as a charging party20 
gets less than he requested, he is treated as a person 
aggrieved under section 10(f)." Id. (citation omitted). 
However, we do not take this to mean that a charging party 
can request relief that is not authorized by the NLRA, and 
then seek compensation as an "aggrieved party" merely 
because he/she was denied some recovery the law did not 
allow in the first place. Common sense dictates that a party 
seeking relief under the NLRA must be denied something 
that is authorized by an applicable law befor e such person 
can be considered "aggrieved" under the Act, and Oil, 
Chemical & Atomic Workers is not to the contrary. 
 
There, two unions attempted to discover the ingredients 
in certain products manufactured by Bor den Chemical 
Company and Colgate Palmolive that the unions 
maintained were harmful to the health and safety of 
employees. The companies refused to disclose that 
information, and the unions filed an unfair labor practice 
charge with the NLRB in two separate pr oceedings. The two 
administrative law judges hearing the charges agreed that 
both Colgate and Borden had engaged in unfair labor 
practices in refusing to divulge the requested information. 
As a result, both companies were or dered to furnish a 
complete list of raw materials and chemicals stor ed, 
handled, or processed at the plants in question. However, 
the orders specifically excepted any infor mation that was 
propriety or a trade secret. The ALJs or dered the unions 
and companies to enter into good faith bargaining to resolve 
the disclosure of any materials that the companies claimed 
were excluded from disclosure, and the unions appealed 
the decision the to NLRB. 
 
The NLRB sustained the orders of disclosur e and agreed 
that the requested information related to the health and 
safety of employees and therefore r elated to the terms and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
20. A "charging party" is the person bringing an unfair labor practice 
charge before the Board. Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers Local Union No. 
6-418, AFL-CIO, 694 F.2d at 1295 n.10. The person or entity alleged to 
have committed the unfair labor practice is the"charged party." Id. 
Obviously, Quick is the charging party her e and the Union is the 
charged party. 
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conditions of employment. Id. at 1293. The Board therefore 
agreed that the union was entitled to all of the requested 
information, but declined to order the r elease of proprietary 
information or trade secrets because of the need to balance 
the union's need for such information against the 
"legitimate and substantial confidentiality interests of the 
employer." Id. (quoting Detr oit Edison Company v. NLRB, 
440 U.S. 301 (1979). However, the Boar d declined to 
undertake that balancing test itself, and or dered the parties 
to resolve it through bargaining. Both companies and the 
unions filed petitions of review with the Court of Appeals 
for the D.C. Circuit. The companies moved to dismiss the 
unions' petitions arguing that the unions lacked standing 
under S 10(f). The companies insisted that the unions were 
not aggrieved because they had obtained virtually all the 
relief they sought.21 The companies reasoned that the 
Board's decision afforded the unions disclosure of nearly 
everything they sought. The court of appeals disagr eed, and 
held that the unions were aggrieved within the meaning of 
S 10(f) because the Board's order pr ecluded them from 
getting some information relating to the working conditions 
of union members even though the unions had won the 
right to get the vast majority of the information they 
sought. It was in that context that the court held that the 
charging party is "aggrieved [as long as it] gets less than [it] 
requested. . . " Id. at 1294. However, the law clearly entitled 
those unions to the relief they were seeking, and the issue 
of their standing under S 10(f) turned on whether the 
Board's order actually gave them all they were entitled to 
under the law. 
 
Under the reasoning of Oil Chemical & Atomic Workers, 
Quick's status as an "aggrieved" party under the NLRB's 
order turns on whether the NLRB has the authority to 
award attorney's fees to a charging party who was forced to 
defend himself in an unlawful lawsuit filed by a union, but 
who incurred neither expense nor liability in defending 
against the suit. That is an entirely dif ferent question than 
the one posed by the inquiry into the unions' status in Oil 
Chemical & Atomic Workers. If the Boar d has the power to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
21. Both sides agreed that 99.5% of the companies' ingredients and 
materials were not protected under the Board's order. 
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award attorney's fees here, Quick is arguably "aggrieved" 
under S 10(f); if it does not, he clearly is not "aggrieved" and 
therefore lacks standing.22 
 
It is readily apparent that S 10(c) is the only provision of 
the NLRA which could possibly support Quick's r equest for 
an award of attorney's fees here. It provides in relevant part 
as follows: 
 
       If upon the preponderance of the testimony taken the 
       NLRB shall be of the opinion that any person named in 
       the complaint has engaged in or is engaging in any 
       such unfair labor practice, then the NLRB shall state 
       its findings of fact and shall issue and cause to be 
       served on such person an order requiring such person 
       to cease and desist from such unfair labor practice, 
       and to take such affirmative action including 
       reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, 
       as will effectuate the policies of [the Act]. 
 
29 U.S.C. S 160(c)(emphasis added). Section 10(c) "vest[s] in 
the NLRB the primary responsibility and br oad discretion to 
devise remedies that effectuate the policies of the Act, 
subject only to limited judicial review." Sure-Tan, Inc. v. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
22. Quick's petition for review is not aimed at recovering attorney's fees 
and costs for representation in the NLRB proceedings. In fact, Quick 
could not request attorney's fees for r epresentation in the NLRB 
proceedings because the General Counsel pr osecutes the case in NLRB 
proceedings, 
 
       the charging party's participation in the litigation is strictly 
       voluntary. The union, employee, or employer filing a charge with 
the 
       Board need not play any role in the pr oceedings beyond serving the 
       respondent with a copy of the charge. Although the charging party 
       may, if the General Counsel issues a complaint, participate in the 
       hearing, nothing in the Act or in the Board's r egulations requires 
it 
       to do so. If the General Counsel calls the char ging party as a 
       witness, . . . then the General Counsel must pay the witness a fee 
       for his time. In short, a charging party need not incur any 
litigation 
       expense. Of course, the charging party may (and often does) 
       intervene in the proceedings before the Board, but it does so as a 
       volunteer, not a party haled into litigation willy-nilly. 
 
Unbelievable, Inc. v. NLRB, 118 F.3d 795, 803 (D.C. Cir. 1997)(citations 
omitted). 
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NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 898-99 (1984). Judicial r eview of the 
NLRB's remedial orders is limited "[b]ecause the relation of 
remedy to policy is peculiarly a matter for administrative 
competence." Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 
194 (1941). Therefore, "courts must not enter the allowable 
area of the Board's discretion and must guard against the 
danger of sliding unconsciously from the narr ow confines of 
law into the more spacious domain of policy." Id. 
 
In devising remedies to undue the effects of unfair labor 
practices, the NLRB "draws on a fund of knowledge and 
expertise all its own," NLRB v. Gissell Packing Co., 395 U.S. 
575, 613 n.32 (1969), and on its "enlightenment gained by 
experience." Fibre Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 
203, 216 (1964)(citation omitted). Consequently, courts of 
appeals "should not substitute their judgment for that of 
the NLRB in determining how best to undue the effects of 
unfair labor practices." Sure-T an, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. at 
899. The NLRB's choice of a remedy must be given "special 
respect by reviewing courts," NLRB v. Gissell Packing Co., 
395 U.S. at 613 n.32, and must not be disturbed"unless 
it can be shown that the order is a patent attempt to 
achieve ends other than those which can fairly be said to 
effectuate the policies of the Act." Fibre Paper Products 
Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. at 216 (citation omitted). 
 
It is not clear to us whether Quick is claiming that the 
Board abused its discretion in denying his request for 
attorney's fees or whether he is arguing that the NLRA 
requires that the Board order an award of attorney's fees. 
However, we do not find any support for the latter position 
in the text of the Act, or in case law interpr eting it. To the 
extent that Quick is arguing that the NLRB abused its 
discretion by not awarding him attor ney's fees, we disagree. 
In fact, we believe that the NLRB's remedial or der here was 
eminently reasonable. 
 
The NLRA "confers rights only on employees," Lechmere, 
Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 532 (1992), and its purpose is 
the "protection of employees and the r edress of their 
grievances . . . after the employees have been made whole." 
Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 11 (1940). 
Accordingly, it has long been recognized that the NLRB's 
"power to command affirmative action is r emedial, not 
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punitive." Id. at 12. However, the NLRB's remedial power 
under S 10 "is merely incidental to the primary purpose of 
Congress to stop and prevent unfair labor practices." 
Shepard v. NLRB, 459 U.S. 344, 352 (1983)(citation 
omitted). The Supreme Court reminds us"[t]he NLRB is not 
a court; it is not even a labor court; it is an administrative 
agency charged by Congress with the enfor cement and 
administration of the federal labor laws." Id. at 351. 
Requests for "complete relief " that might find a "receptive 
ear in a court of general jurisdiction" will often fall on deaf 
ears before the NLRB, because there ar e "wide differences 
between administrative agencies and courts." 23 Id. There is 
"nothing in the language or structure of the Act that 
requires the NLRB to reflexively or der that which a 
complaining party may regard as `complete relief ' for every 
unfair labor practice . . ." Id. at 352 (citation omitted). 
 
Here, the Board found that the Union violated S 8(b)(1)(A). 
It then ordered the Union to "r eimburse [Quick] only for the 
personal expenses he actually incurred in defending against 
the lawsuit filed by the [Union]," pursuant to the discretion 
vested in it under S 10(c). Board's Decision and Order, at 1 
n.2. The Board's order was the kind of r eimbursement 
order "typically used to `make whole' employees for 
violations of the Act." Teamsters Local 36, 249 NLRB 386 
n.2, affirmed sub nom., Shepar d v. NLRB, 459 U.S. 344 
(1983). Quick has clearly been made whole. 
 
Moreover, the remedial order here is consistent with prior 
NLRB practice. In a recent case involving the Foundation's 
attempt to recover attorney's fees under circumstances 
analogous to the case at bar, the Boar d stated: 
 
       We note that it is not the individual Char ging Parties 
       who seek reimbursement for such expenses, since it is 
       undisputed that they incurred none. Rather it is the 
       Charging Parties' attorney, employed by the National 
       Right to Work Legal Defense and Education 
       Foundation, who seeks reimbursement for expenses 
       and legal services which were provided under a "no fee" 
       arrangement with the Charging Parties. The 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
23. See e.g., Federal Communications Commission v. Pottsville 
Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 141-44 (1940). 
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       Foundation contends that "[j]ust as in the context of 
       litigation under 42 U.S.C. S 1988, the identity of the 
       attorney or the fact that the litigant did not personally 
       incur legal expenses - because those expenses wer e 
       paid by a charitable organization - cannot be 
       determinative" of its entitlement to an award of 
       attorney's fees. 
 
        We disagree. The National Labor Relations Act, which 
       is essentially remedial, authorizes the NLRB to provide 
       relief for actual losses of parties to our pr oceedings or 
       those found to be victims of unfair labor practices. It is 
       not aimed at compensating attorneys. By contrast, the 
       attorney fee provision in 42 U.S.C. S 1988, specifically 
       authorizes Federal courts to award attor ney's fees to 
       prevailing parties in certain civil rights actions brought 
       in Federal court. Although 42 U.S.C. S 1988 has been 
       construed, consistent with congressional intent to 
       encourage the availability of competent counsel for 
       plaintiffs in private civil rights suits, to allow entities 
       like the Foundation to recover attorney fees in such 
       suits regardless whether the plaintif fs themselves 
       incurred those fees (see Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 
       U.S. 87 (1989)), it does not apply to proceedings under 
       the NLRA. Accordingly, the judge did not err in failing 
       to provide for such recovery. 
 
United Food and Commercial Workers Locals 951, 7 and 
1036 (Meijer, Inc.), 329 NLRB No. 69, 1999 WL 818607 at 
*14-15 (NLRB Sept. 30, 1999). The NLRB relied upon 
United Food and Commercial Workers in denying Quick's 
request for attorney's fees. 
 
Nonetheless, Quick contends that by denying his r equest 
for attorney's fees for volunteered legal services the NLRB 
somehow ignored the Court's decision in Bill Johnson's 
Restaurants. There, the Court held that where the NLRB 
finds that an employer has an illegal objective infiling a 
lawsuit against employees, the NLRB, as a remedial 
measure, "may order the employer to reimburse the 
employees whom [the employer] had wrongfully sued for 
their attorney's fees and other expenses . . .[and] may also 
order any other proper relief that would effectuate the 
policies of the Act." Id. at 747 (emphasis added). Although 
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Bill Johnson's Restaurant involved an employer's suit 
against its employees, the underlying principles ar e equally 
applicable when a union files an unlawful lawsuit against 
an employee. 
 
Nevertheless, Quick's reliance on Bill Johnson's 
Restaurant, is completely misplaced. In fact, the Court's 
brief mention of available remedies ther e fully supports the 
Board's decision to deny Quick's request for attorney's fees 
here. The Court used the permissive "may," not the 
mandatory "shall," and thereby indicated that the Board 
has the discretion to award attorney's fees in an 
appropriate case. Since no attorney's fees were incurred 
here, this is not an appropriate case. Mor eover, in Bill 
Johnson's Restaurant the Court said that the Board may 
"reimburse" such fees. "Reimburse" means "to pay back to 
someone." WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 993 
(1990). Quick's argument requires us to ignore that 
wording or redefine "reimburse."24 We are neitherwilling, 
nor able to do that. 
 
The NLRA, unlike federal statutes expressly authorizing 
an award of attorney's fees,25  does not contain a provision 
for the award of attorney's fees to pr evailing parties. In 
Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 
240, 262 (1975), the Court ruled that "the cir cumstances 
under which attorney's fees are to be awarded and the 
range of discretion of the courts in making those awards 
are matters for Congress to determine." Section S 10(c) of 
the Act does not expressly provide for the payment of 
attorney's fees. We need not now decide whether any 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
24. " `When I use a word,' Humpty Dumpty said, in a rather scornful 
tone, `it means just what I choose it to mean-- neither more nor less.' 
 
`The question is,' said Alice, `whether you can make words mean so 
many different things.' 
 
`The question is,' said Humpty Dumpty, `which is to be master -- 
that's all.' " 
 
LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE'S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND (1865). 
 
25. See, e. g., the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of 1976,42 
U.S.C. S 1988(b), and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 
S 12205. 
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circumstances could ever exist that would justify an award 
of attorney's fees under S 10. However , absent "clear 
support" for an award of attorney's fees, either in the 
language or the legislative history of the statute, we cannot 
infer congressional intent to override the historic 
presumption against an award of attor ney's fees in the 
circumstances here. Summit Valley Industries, Inc. v. 
Carpenters, 456 U.S. 717, 726 (1982). 
 
Quick relies on two cases in which the Foundation was 
awarded counsel fees for representing employees in actions 
against their unions even though the Foundation 
represented the employees free of charge. However, those 
cases involved public sector employees' lawsuits alleging 
constitutional violations against public sector unions and 
were, therefore, actions under 42 U.S.C. S 1983.26 The 
attorney's fee awards in those cases wer e therefore 
pursuant to fee-shifting provisions of S 1988, under which 
attorney's fees can be awarded even though the prevailing 
plaintiffs are represented fr ee of charge by nonprofit legal 
aid organizations. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886 (1984). 
Accordingly, S 10(c) of the Act was not implicated in either 
case. 
 
For all of the above reasons, we find that Quick does not 
have standing to request attorney's fees from the Board 
under the NLRA, and that the requested awar d of fees is 
beyond the statutory powers of the NLRB under the 
circumstances here. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
For all of the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition 
for review and grant the petition for enfor cement. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
26. See, Johnson v. Lafayette Fire Fighters' Association, 857 F. Supp. 
1292 (N. D. Ind. 1994), aff 'd, 51F.3d 726 (7th Cir. 1995), and Tierney 
v. City of Toledo, 132 LRRM (BNA) 2829, 1989 WL 1615453 (N. D. Ohio, 
August 28, 1989). 
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